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Abstract 
An effective public safety net can be important in a poor transition economy such as 
Vietnam.  Yet we know very little about the performance of existing public transfers as a 
safety net.  Using panel data, the paper investigates whether Vietnam’s main social 
welfare transfers promoted poor people out of poverty and whether they protected the 
non-poor from becoming poor.  It also explores the role transfer programs played in the 
country’s dramatic reduction of poverty in the 1990s.  Counterfactual consumption levels 
without transfers allow for behavioral responses.  The findings suggest that transfer 
programs helped few people escape poverty and protected even fewer from falling into 
poverty.  The public safety net appears to have been largely irrelevant to the country’s 
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Testing Vietnam’s Public Safety Net 
Dominique van de Walle 
I  Introduction 
Vietnam has averaged yearly growth rates of 6 to 7 percent per capita since it 
began its reforms in the late 1980s.  The country has also successfully spread the benefits 
of this growth in the form of a substantial reduction in poverty.  By one well-accepted 
definition of the poverty line for Vietnam, the national headcount index declined from 
58.2 percent in 1992 to 37.4 percent in 1998 and from 66.4 to 45.5 percent in rural areas 
(Glewwe et al. 2000).
1   
Yet, as these numbers attest, Vietnam remains a poor country.  The rural 
population continues to be primarily engaged in agriculture and  to be vulnerable to 
numerous daily hazards, such as illness, crop and animal diseases, unfavorable climatic 
conditions and (increasingly), international price swings and trade restrictions.  
Occasionally — and some argue with increasing frequency — devastating shocks such as 
cyclones and severe flooding wipe out lives and livelihoods and the hope of escaping 
poverty (Beckman et al. 2002, Benson 1997).   
In this context, there is a potential role for a public safety net.  Vietnam boasts its 
fair share of public spending on transfers that might serve this role.  The main question 
this paper tries to address is whether existing social welfare programs perform a genuine 
safety net function — recognizing that this involves both protection from poverty and 
promotion from poverty.  In principle, a safety net can reduce poverty either by 
protecting non-poor people from becoming poor or by promoting poor people out of 
poverty (a distinction due to Drèze and Sen, 1989).  How does Vietnam's existing safety 
net perform in both functions?  With panel data, methods exist to address this question 
following Ravallion, van de Walle and Gautam (1995).  The availability of the Vietnam 
                                                 
1 First order stochastic dominance indicates robustness to choice of poverty line and poverty measure.   2
Living Standards Surveys (VLSS)  for 1992/3 and 1997/8 allows comparisons over time 
including longitudinal comparison for the same households.   
The paper applies panel data methods in studying Vietnam's safety net.  This 
appears to be the first attempt to apply such methods to a developing country.
2 An earlier 
analysis of the incidence across households and communes of social welfare and poverty-
related initiatives found generally poor targeting performance (van de Walle 2001).  Yet, 
such a static incidence picture may be deceptive about the degree to which outlays, 
coverage, and changes over time, were perhaps correlated to poverty related shocks and 
changes in exogenous variables.  The paper asks: Does the public safety net respond to 
changing household circumstances?  Vietnam in the 1990s is an interesting setting for 
examining these issues.  In addition to the continuing and (probably) enhanced exposure 
to uninsured risk in the transition period, there was more than a doubling of total 
spending on selected transfers between the two survey dates.  The setting provides an 
interesting quasi-experiment in who benefited from the changes in outlays in a poor 
transition economy.   
In exploring the dynamic performance of the safety net in Vietnam, a key concern 
is of how to define who is “poor.”  In common with much of the literature on poverty in 
developing countries, the paper uses household consumption expenditure per capita as its 
welfare measure.  This is a comprehensive consumption aggregate.  However, to some 
extent, the observed household consumption data reflect existing public transfers.  
Ignoring this fact is clearly hazardous in attempting to draw conclusions about the 
counterfactual of what welfare would have been without transfers, and hence, about the 
incidence of transfers. The paper implements a method for dealing with this concern. 
The next section provides an overview of what is known about the existing social 
protection and poverty programs in Vietnam.  Section 3 discusses the data used for the 
analysis in this paper, while section 4 derives our indicator of welfare allowing for 
behavioral responses to public transfers to get at the counterfactual welfare indicator.  
Results on the degree of protection and promotion afforded by the existing social safety 
                                                 
2 The only previous applications have been to Hungary (Ravallion et al, 1995) and Russia (Lokshin and 
Ravallion, 2000).  Sumarto et al.  (2003) propose a “dynamic benefit incidence” which differs from the 
present approach  in that the concern is solely with how well programs target households from the point of 
view of both their initial welfare and the severity of a shock to their welfare.    3
net are examined in section 5.  Section 6 concludes the paper.  
  
II  Public responses to poverty and risk in Vietnam 
Vietnam has a panoply of social welfare programs and initiatives.  This reflects a 
deep-seated and longstanding state ideology of combating inequality and raising the 
living standards of all its regions and people.  It is also a reflection of  the expectation 
that ideology has fomented among the population.  Since it adopted the market economy, 
the regime’s enduring legitimacy arguably rests on this political commitment and its 
perceived realization.  In practice, however, the  programs are often ad hoc, poorly 
funded, and largely reliant on scarce local resources.    
During the cooperative and collective period, communes  took the social and 
welfare needs of their members in hand.  Education and health services were provided as 
well as assistance and social security when households faced difficult life-cycle changes 
and shocks (Kolko 1997; Glewwe and Litvack 1998).  These services were largely 
financed by the cooperatives with some assistance from the central government.   
After the cooperatives were disbanded in 1988, and following cuts in public social 
sector spending and various privatization and liberalization measures, much of the cost 
burden of obtaining such services shifted to households.  Peasants are more likely to be 
relying on informal mechanisms to deal with shocks.  So, though on average richer, it can 
be argued that  they are also likely to be more vulnerable today (Kolko 1997; Glewwe 
and Litvack 1998).   
User fees for health care services and all but primary schooling were introduced.  
Medical costs increased.  Overall, the reforms have resulted in vastly increased  total 
education and health out-of-pocket spending.  These changes have raised concerns about 
access by the poor and the specter of rising social differentiation and income inequality.  
Such concerns have in turn led to attempts to redress rising inequalities.  Targeted 
schooling fee exemptions were instituted, but give limited relief as fees account for only 
a small share of total school-related expenditures (Behrman and Knowles 1999).  A 
compulsory health insurance scheme was introduced in 1993 to cover formal sector 
workers and current and retired civil servants.  This was soon supplemented by another 
scheme that aims to extend coverage to students, agricultural and informal sector workers   4
on a voluntary basis.  However, the better-off are found to be the main participants in the 
schemes (Wagstaff and Pradhan 2003).  Poor households continue to be unlikely to be 
able to insure themselves against severe health shocks.   
The social protection system that has evolved since decollectivization is 
composed of a number of different initiatives that are centrally mandated but locally 
implemented, often relying heavily on local resources.
3  The  Social Security System 
provides pensions and other employment-related social insurance payments such as for 
maternity and disability to formal sector workers. It has covered public servants and 
military personnel since 1947 and was extended to other formal sector employees in 1995 
(MOLISA 1999).  These social insurance payments are still heavily subsidized by the 
central budget though they are eventually meant to be funded exclusively from payroll 
taxes and employee contributions.  An analysis of the VLSS 1998 reveals that payments 
go to members of households accounting for 11.2 percent of the population nationally,  
with greater coverage in urban (18.3%) than in rural areas (9.4%) as might be expected 
(van de Walle 2001).  Incidence is also found to be pro-poor in urban areas but much less 
so in rural areas where per capita amounts received (per person) are also much smaller.     
  Social subsidy transfers are available to compensate and assist those who 
contributed and suffered from the wars — disabled veterans, relatives of dead soldiers, 
and others who contributed to the revolution  — from the Social Guarantee Fund for 
Veterans and War Invalids.  Others u nable to support themselves — including the 
disabled, orphans and the elderly — are in theory granted social subsidy transfers under 
the Social Guarantee Fund for Regular Relief.  But, here in particular, scarce central 
public resources imply that implementation and coverage ultimately depend in large part 
on local level governments and resources.  Social subsidy transfers are often touted by 
the government as reaching the poor.  Yet only 9.6 percent of the population are found to 
live in households who report receiving social subsidies nationally, and only slightly 
higher at 10.2 percent in rural areas. Payment amounts are highest for the poorest quintile 
in urban areas.  But, there is little sign of targeting across the rest of the urban or rural 
distributions where little variation is evidenced in either percentages of recipients or 
amounts received (van de Walle 2001).    5
The central government also runs a Contingency Fund for Pre-Harvest Starvation 
and Natural Disasters whose role is to minimize the consequences of natural calamities 
and other emergencies by dispensing disaster relief to regions and households.  Following 
local covariate shocks, relief is provided by district and provincial authorities with the 
frequent assistance of Vietnam’s Red Cross and the mass organizations.  Field studies 
indicate that emphasis is placed primarily on surviving the emergency and a common 
instrument is credit for disaster recovery (Beckman et al. 2001, Benson 1997).  Because 
institutional capacity and finances are limited, the aid tends to be short of what would be 
necessary to get households back on their pre-crisis development path.  Poor households 
in particular are prone to further impoverishment as a result (Beckman et al. 2001).   
Finally, a number of  National Development Programs which aim to reduce 
poverty have been introduced, though their focus is generally more on promoting growth 
than on providing protection. National programs cover employment generation, 
reforestation, school and health fee exemptions, micro-credit schemes and physical 
infrastructure investments. It is not clear whether education scholarships as reported in 
the VLSS 1998 are granted under one of the national programs or not.  Relatively few 
appear to be allocated (the survey sample identifies 141), and incidence is clearly 
regressive (van de Walle 2001). 
In 1996 the government proposed a national hunger elimination and poverty 
reduction (HEPR) program to bring all these efforts, as well as their resources under one 
umbrella.  Many government programs have subsequently been consolidated under the 
HEPR national poverty program in order to better mobilize and coordinate antipoverty 
resources.  Within this, the government implemented the ‘National Target Program on 
Poverty Alleviation’ between 1998 and 2000 and has recently prepared a ‘Poverty 
Alleviation Strategy’ for 2001-2010 (MOLISA 2001).  These new initiatives do not 
appear to have entailed much change in policy focus or new funding from the central 
government. The policy areas have all been emphasized in the past and addressed by past 
programs and a variety of  ad hoc schemes. New poverty mandates and targets are 
imposed on ministries by HEPR without the benefit of additional funding or reductions in 
other mandated responsibilities (van de Walle 1999, Nguyen The Dzung, 1999).     
                                                                                                                                                 
3  van de Walle (1999) provides more details.   6
Throughout all these programs, eligibility criteria, guidelines and norms are 
largely dictated by the center, while implementation is chiefly the responsibility of the 
communes.  Poverty and needs are locally determined following national norms but 
heavily influenced by available local means and resources.  Communes initially draw up 
lists of eligible candidates for the different social protection programs to reflect their 
needs.
4  These are gathered, altered and eventually approved and passed on by the 
districts and the provinces to the center.  Following a process of review and negotiation 
between a number of Ministries in Hanoi, transfers are made to the provinces. 
 
III  Data 
 
  The following analysis of Vietnam’s safety net uses the nationally representative 
1992/93 and 1997/98 Vietnam Living Standards Surveys (VLSS).
5 These multi-topic 
household consumption expenditure surveys covered 4800 households spread across 150 
communes in 1993, and 6000 households living in 194 communes in 1998.  A panel of 
4308 households is also contained in the surveys.  In addition, a community questionnaire 
was administered in the communes in which the rural or small town households reside — 
120 and 156 communes in 1993 and 1998 respectively.   
The surveys contain numerous modules covering aspects of living standards.
6  
The 1998 survey contains considerably more information on government programs and 
policies than the 1993 survey.  Since our interest in this paper is with the dynamic 
performance of transfer programs, the focus will be limited to transfer receipts for which 
a comparison can be made over time.  These are education scholarships, social insurance 
and social subsidy funds.
7  There are, of course, many other ways in which the 
government intervenes to increase social welfare ￿ for example through subsidizing 
                                                 
4 The lists are of people or households depending on the program. 
5 The 1992/93 survey spanned a full year starting in October 1992, while the 1997/98 survey began in 
December 1997 for lasted a year. For brevity's sake I will refer to the surveys as the 1993 and 1998 surveys 
respectively.  
6 World Bank 1995 and 2000 provide detailed information on the surveys. 
7 In 1998, details are also available on whether the household received  transfers from the poverty 
alleviation fund or NGOs.  The amounts involved are negligible.   
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micro-credit and various goods and disaster relief (MOLISA 1999).  The survey does not 
allow an analysis of these schemes. Here the focus is on the main national transfer 
programs.   
The welfare indicator is defined as annual per capita consumption, including the 
value of own production and the use value of consumer durables including imputed 
housing expenditures (World Bank 1995 and 2000).  Consumption expenditures and 
other monetary amounts are expressed in real January 1998 national prices, taking 
account both of inflation through the survey year and of  variation in prices spatially.  
Although the 1998 survey sought to improve the measurement of consumption in certain 
ways, the questionnaire also ensured that comparability across the two dates would be 
feasible.  Two total consumption expenditure measures ￿ namely, one which is the best 
possible measure for 1998 in terms of being the most comprehensive, and another which 
is made comparable to the 1993 expenditure totals — are therefore available.  For all 
comparisons over time, the paper uses the inter-temporally comparable measures of 
consumption, but sticks with the best 1998 measure otherwise.  The latter better captures 
tobacco consumption and the consumption value of own-produced non-food items such 
as coal, wood, and flowers.    
 
IV  Estimating behavioral responses to public transfers 
 
Clearly, to determine whether programs reach the poor, the poor need first to be 
identified by an appropriate indicator of welfare without the programs.  Measured 
outcomes will depend on that choice: the appearance of either good or bad targeting may 
just be due to deficient welfare measurement.   
Studies of the incidence of public spending typically subtract the entire amount of 
government transfer receipts from household income or consumption to approximate pre-
intervention welfare, and so rank the population into quintiles (say).  Netting transfers out 
fully assumes that there is no replacement through savings, labor effort, schooling 
decisions, inter-household transfers and the myriad other potential household behavioral 
responses.  That assumption is implausible.  In general, because of behavioral responses 
(often given imperfect markets), the full benefits of transfers will not be passed onto 
consumption.  The opposite assumption—treating post-transfer consumption as t he   8
welfare indicator—is just as questionable.  Ideally, one would like to subtract the 
intervention amount but add in the replacement income households would have had 
through their behavioral responses had they not benefited from the intervention.  
The paper addresses these concerns by econometrically estimating the marginal 
propensity to consume out of social income (PCSI).  This is then used to determine the 
net gain to consumption from social transfers and to construct the counterfactual 
consumption level without intervention.  In the following analysis, transfers comprise 
social insurance, social subsidies and education scholarship receipts — the components 
of social income that can be identified from both surveys.  
It is assumed that consumption of household i at time t (t=1993, 1998) ( it C ) can 
be represented as an additive function of public transfers ( it T ), observed household 
characteristics ( it X ), and latent factors that are both time varying ( t d ) and time invariant 
( i h ): 
  it t i it it it X T C e d h g b a + + + + + = ,                  (1) 
where eit is an error component that varies between households and overtime.   
There are a number of potential problems with estimating  b with this equation.  
An endogeneity concern arises due to the likely correlation between transfers and time 
invariant household characteristics (cov( it T i h )„0).  This could result from purposive 
targeting to the long term poor.  Another possible source of endogeneity arises if transfers 
are correlated with time varying determinants of consumption (cov( it T t d )„0 or 
cov( it T eit)„0).  This would occur if transfers target those who suffered a shock or simply 
because of transfer eligibility changes, such as if a pension-receiving elderly household 
member dies.  Some such changes may be observed in the data, others may not.  A final 
issue relates to the possibility of heterogeneity of the behavioral response.  Different 
household characteristics may lead to different PCSI for different households. 
  A double differencing model where all variables are expressed in first differences, 
purges the estimate of fixed effects and thus deals with the first source of endogeneity.  
Then equation (1) becomes:  
  it t it it it X T C e d g b D + D + D + D = D                     (2)   9
Since there are only two rounds of data, the term  t d D becomes an ordinary intercept term 
in a regression of the change in consumption on the change in transfers.  This regression 
was initially run assuming that  it X D g = 0 (characteristics don’t change or don’t have any 
effect), giving the standard “double difference” estimate of the consumption impact of 
transfers.  This gives ab estimate of 0.45 with a heteroscedasticity and clustering-
corrected t-statistic of  4.3 (Table 1).  As discussed, this double difference estimate may 
still be contaminated through dependence of the change in transfers on time varying 
characteristics.  A difference regression of transfers on characteristics attests to such a 
correlation, as can be seen in Table 1, column 2.  The regression controls for changes in 
household size and composition—in particular, the number of members in the 0 to 6 and 
7 to 16 age groups, the number of women and men over 55 and 60 respectively (the 
formal sector legal retirement age)—a change in the highest grade completed by the most 
educated member of the household, the change in the age and gender of the household 
head and finally a change in the language of interview.
8  Transfers are found to respond 
significantly and negatively to increases in household size and to a change from Kinh to 
other interview language.  Significant positive effects are found for increases in the 
number of small children, women aged over 55, the head's age and changing from a male 
to a female head.  
The next regression in Table 1 therefore controls for changes in observable 
household characteristics in the double difference model of consumption as a function of 
transfers.  Here too, changes in household size and in the language of the interview have 
a significant negative impact, while an older head and a higher educational level 
significantly influences consumption positively. In this case the b estimate is 0.37 (t=3.6).  
It is not significantly different from the initial simple double difference estimate. 
This last estimate is fine as far as it goes, but a worry remains concerning omitted 
variables that may alter over time and affect transfers.  For example, a severe shock that 
triggers a public response and affects household consumption may have occurred but not 
                                                 
8 Households had the option of being interviewed in a language other than the majority Kinh in both survey 
years.  A change from Kinh is likely to signify a change in the ethnicity and Kinh language ability of the 
head of household. 
   10 
be measured in the data. To deal with this problem, an instrumental variable is needed.  A 
good instrument can purge any such latent effects by identifying an exogenous source of 
variation in the change in transfers.    
One possible instrument for the change in transfers is transfer receipts in the first 
period.  A high correlation is found between these variables (0.50).  The instrument is 
then valid under the exclusion restriction that initial transfers are not correlated with the 
change in consumption appears plausible.  The last OLS is re-estimated with the change 
in transfers instrumented by initial transfers.  Here, the estimated b is 0.72 (t=3.7).  This 
is higher, but still not statistically significantly different from the first, naïve estimate.  
There is one cautionary note.  The validity of the instrument could be questioned.  The 
key untestable exclusion restriction is that transfers in 1993 do not appear on the right 
hand side of equation (1) (i.e. cov(eit, Tit-1) = 0).  This would not hold if for example, the 
initial level of transfers helps prevent households from falling into destitution or succeeds 
in putting them on a different growth path.
9     
Finally, to test for possible heterogeneity in impacts, a simple OLS regression is 
run of the change in consumption against interactions between the change in transfers and 
household characteristics, as well as controls for time varying changes in characteristics 
and the change in transfers.  Note that in a difference regression such as this, permanent 
income is effectively controlled for.  As can be seen in Table 1, only two of the 
interaction terms is statistically significant.  The change in transfers interacted with the 
number of men past retirement age is negative suggesting a lower impact of transfers on 
consumption in households with elderly men.  This could indicate a reduction in work 
effort in response to the change in transfer receipts. The interaction of the change in 
transfers with the highest grade completed is positive suggesting that transfers have a 
higher impact on consumption in more educated households.  This seems counter 
intuitive.  However, two possible explanations come to mind.  Controlling for other 
factors, better educated households may more accurately report data on consumption and 
transfers.  Under this interpretation, the interaction is picking up data measurement 
                                                 
9 If another instrument was available, one could do an over-identification test, but there is no obvious 
candidate. 
   11 
errors.  Alternatively, a political economy factor may be at work, whereby more highly 
educated people believe that transfers will be more permanent.   Nonetheless, a test of the 
joint significance of the interaction terms shows them to be insignificant (F(1,150)=1.34).   
Since the null hypothesis that they’re all zero cannot be rejected, we shall go back to the 
previous specifications.    
  The preceding analysis suggests a range of estimates of the PCSI between about 
0.3 to 0.7.  However, none of the estimates were significantly different from the simple 
double difference estimate of 0.5.  So, in the following analysis, consumption 
expenditures are net of  half of the value of transfer receipts that can be identified, unless 
otherwise noted.
10  Table 2 shows the sensitivity of quintile mean per capita expenditures 
and the incidence of mean per capita transfers across quintiles under different 
assumptions about the PCSI — namely fully including, including half only and fully 
excluding social incomes.  Netting out transfers from the welfare indicator enhances the 
seeming progressivity of transfer incidence.  This same pattern is observed in other 
countries and conforms to expectations. 
 
V  Testing a safety net: protection and/or promotion ? 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, there was a clear expansion in the total outlays going to 
social welfare programs between 1993 and 1998.
11 As reported in the survey, mean 
overall real per capita amounts rose from 51,443 to 116,641 dongs in 1998 prices, a 127 
percent proportionate increase.  The mean percentage of household expenditure 
represented by transfers rose from 3.3 to 4.5 percent. 
How were the gains from this expansion in public outlays on transfers distributed?  
Did the expansion help protect people from poverty?  Did it help promote people from 
poverty?  A comparison of panel households over time can help answer these questions 
concerning the performance of the safety net.  An important role for the public sector in a 
                                                 
10 Note that this means half of the total of scholarships, social insurance and subsidy funds for 1992/93 and 
half that same total plus poverty alleviation and NGO funds for 1998.  
11 Note that this refers only to programs — scholarships, social insurance and social subsidies — covered 
in both VLSSs. Although these do not  account for all programs, they cover the bulk of social income 
receipts. 
   12 
poor rural economy like Vietnam is to provide protection for those who are vulnerable to 
poverty due to uninsured shocks.  As already noted, a static incidence picture is 
uninformative about whether transfers perform such a safety net function.  And finding 
that the static incidence is not well-targeted, may indicate little about the responsiveness 
of outlays to poverty related shocks.  There is evidence of considerable variability in 
amounts received from a given program in both 1993 and 1998 (van de Walle, 2001).  
There is also much instability over time in who gets transfers.  For example, out of a total 
of 744 panel households who were beneficiaries of social insurance outlays in one of the 
two survey years, only 402 received them in both years.  Similarly, of the 769 households 
who received social subsidy payments in one year, 111 were recipients in both years.  
Does this reflect a response to changing household circumstances on the part of the 
system?  This section examines social welfare incomes from this perspective.   
When using the panel to study the incidence of the changes in social income, 
there is a question of how one should rank households in deciding who is 'poor'.  Table 3 
ranks households by three different definitions of welfare, which can loosely be referred 
to as the “initial,” “new,” and “long-term poor;” the specific measures are per capita 
expenditures (net of half of transfers) in the initial period, the same in the later period and 
the mean over both years respectively.  The table presents a comparison of mean per 
capita social income receipts in both years.  
The proportional gains from expansion tend to be highest for the poorest quintile 
but neither decrease nor increase with expenditure across higher quintiles.  However, 
among the “poor” in each of the three above senses, the “initial poor” clearly had the 
lowest absolute gains with a 122% proportionate increase in benefits for the bottom 
quintile and a 131% increase for the second lowest.  The “new poor” had the highest 
proportionate gains (137% and 155% increase respectively), while the “long-term poor” 
fall somewhere in between (130% and 139%).  Per capita transfer amounts increased for 
all groups but the percentage of the population receiving transfers declined slightly 
overall (22 to 20 percent), as did the proportion of the poor receiving them by all three 
definitions.  The evidence does not suggest that the poor were specifically targeted by the 
program expansion.  
Were changes in transfers responsive to poverty-related shocks?  Table 4 presents   13 
information on mean changes in transfers received by panel households classified into a 
three by three matrix.  Households ranked into terciles of their initial 1993 level of per 
capita consumption (low, middle or high) are cross-tabbed against the change in their 
consumption between the two dates categorized into whether it underwent a fall, stayed 
more or less the same or rose significantly.
12  So, for example, 34 percent of those who 
were in the bottom third of the consumption distribution in 1993 and experienced a fall in 
their consumption over time, received transfers equal to about 111,901 dongs per person 
in recipient households.   
There is little sign that the system responded to consumption shocks.  Indeed, the 
percentage of households who benefited from social incomes is relatively uniform across 
cells.  Neither starting out poor, nor experiencing negative consumption shocks, appears 
to have elicited a response from social welfare programs.  32 percent of those who 
enjoyed the highest initial consumption and the highest gains to consumption were 
beneficiaries compared to 34% of the worst off in both respects.  The per capita transfer 
amounts of participants tend to increase with initial welfare.  Among the poor, those who 
suffered a drop in consumption saw the lowest gains in public transfers.  However, there 
is some sign that public transfers helped compensate for drops in consumption among the 
high consumption group.  Broadly speaking however, these specific programs appear 
fairly unresponsive to shocks. 
Location may be an important factor in the determination of program participation 
(van de Walle 2001).  Possibly the absence of a pattern in Table 4 arises from variation 
across geographical areas that is obscuring patterns within  them. To test this, a linear 
probability model was estimated of whether transfers were received in 1998 against 
initial per capita consumption expenditures and the change in per capita consumption.  
This regression was run with and without commune effects.  With commune effects, 
there is no sign of transfers responding either to initial consumption or to changes in 
consumption.  Without commune effects, the results suggest that transfers respond 
perversely to initial consumption (b =1.12e-8, t=2.52) and not to shocks (similarly to 
                                                 
12 Consumption in 1993 is net of half of transfers, while changes in consumption are net of half the change 
in transfers.  
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Table 4).  This suggests that it is households in richer communes that primarily benefit 
from gains in transfers. 
It is of further interest to examine what role transfers played in the impressive 
reduction in poverty that occurred over this period.  The panel structure is now exploited 
to evaluate how well the safety net performed dynamically including how well it 
protected against poverty distinguished from how well it promoted out of poverty, 
following the approach proposed in Ravallion, van de Walle and Gautam (1995).  In 
comparing joint distributions of consumption expenditures, such as with and without 
policy changes, the approach defines tests of a policy’s ability to protect the poor (PROT) 
and its ability to promote the poor (PROM).  The following summarizes the tests 
proposed in Ravallion et al., (1995).  
In comparing joint distributions - such as with and without policy changes - two 
tests are used: how well people are protected from poverty, and how well they are 
promoted from poverty.  To define these, let x denote the welfare indicator, found in the 
interval (0, x
max).  Consider two possible joint distribution functions over dates 1 and 2, 
namely F(x1,x2) and G(x1,x2) (i.e., F(x1,x2) is the proportion of the population with less 
than  x1 in period 1, and less than  x2 in period 2, and similarly for  G(x1,x2)).  The 
corresponding marginal distributions are F1(x1) = F(x1,x
max) and F2(x2) = F(x
max,x2), and 
similarly for G.  The poverty line is z, and so the proportion of the population who are 
poor in period 1 in the F distribution is F1(z), while a proportion F2(z) are poor at date 2.  
By construction, F2(z) - F(z,z) is the proportion of individuals in the F distribution who 
are poor in the second period but were not poor in the first.  I will say that F protects 
from poverty better than G if and only if 
F2(z) - F(z,z) < G2(z) - G(z,z)    
The extent of protection allowed by F relative to G will be measured by  
PROT(z) = G2(z) - G(z,z) - F2(z) + F(z,z)      (3)     
Analogously, F1(z) - F(z,z) of the population were poor in the first period but not the 
second.  F promotes the poor better than G if and only if 
F1(z) - F(z,z) > G1(z) - G(z,z) 
And the extent of promotion due to F relative to G will be measured by 
PROM(z) = F1(z) - F(z,z) - G1(z) + G(z,z)      (4)       15 
In all cases considered in this paper the marginal distributions in the first period 
are identical; F1(z)=G1(z), which is simply the pre-intervention distribution.  It follows 
that promotion is equivalent to requiring that  F(z,z) <  G(z,z) i.e., PROM can be 
interpreted as a test of whether there is less persistent poverty in the F distribution, the 
persistently poor being defined as those who were poor in both periods.  The residual, 
F2(z) - F(z,z), is then interpretable as the amount of transient poverty, which is precisely 
what PROT tests for.
13   
Table 5 presents the baseline joint distribution of consumption in the two years.  
Households are classified into four groups according to whether they were poor or non-
poor in both years, and whether they escaped or fell into poverty over the period. There is 
evidence of a large fall in poverty: 26 percent of the population escaped poverty, 5 
percent fell into poverty, 34 percent were persistently poor and 35 percent were never 
poor.  This suggests considerable persistent poverty.   
What is the effect of transfers on poverty?  To answer this question, it is necessary 
to simulate the counterfactual joint distribution without transfers.  As in static incidence 
calculations, this is done by subtracting half the transfers received in each respective year 
from consumption in that year.  The simulated joint distribution is given in Table 6.  
Transfers are found to have negligible impact on poverty.  Without them, one and two 
additional percent of the population would have been poor in 1993 and 1998 respectively.  
The measures of promotion and protection are not statistically significantly different from 
zero.  Table 7 simulates the joint distribution had there been no changes in transfers 
between the two dates.  The change in the proportion who fell into poverty identifies the 
degree of protection offered while the change in the proportion who escaped poverty 
indicates promotion.  Changes enabled just over one percentage of the population to 
escape poverty, while they protected about one percent from falling into poverty. Again, 
these are not statistically different from zero. Low spending, low coverage and poor 
targeting together explain the negligible impact of transfers and changes in transfers on 
poverty.   
                                                 
13 Another implication of identical first-period marginals is that if both PROT and PROM are positive then 
F2(z) < G2(z) (i.e., the incidence of poverty is lower for the F distribution in period 2), though the converse 
is not true (lower poverty in period 2 is possible with only one of PROT or PROM holding).   16 
How much could better targeting improve impacts on poverty incidence?  Table 8 
compares the current distribution relative to a simulated uniform allocation of actual 1998 
social income across the entire population.  This would  have a small but statistically 
significant additional impact on poverty: an additional 3 percent of the population (7 
percent of the poor) under the actual allocation would escape poverty (s.e.=0.4%).  Just 
over two percent of the non-poor would have fallen into poverty (s.e.=0.2%).   
What if 1998 transfers were instead targeted based on an equal allocation to those 
below the poverty line only?  The results in Table 9 show that outlays would be sufficient 
to bring 17 percent of the poor (7% of the population with a standard error estimate of 
0.4%) out of poverty.  Only 3 percent of the non-poor would have fallen into poverty (3% 
of the population with a s.e. of 0.2%). 
Finally, going back to the concerns of Table 3, Table 10 presents the joint 
distribution of the incidence of proportionate gains in social incomes.  When ranked by 
their 1998 welfare, large gains are again apparent for the non-poor.  The new information 
here is that within the non-poor, the largest gains went to those who were initially poor.  
Once again, the evidence suggests very poor performance on protection.   
 
VI  Conclusions 
Poverty fell quite dramatically in Vietnam between 1993 and 1998.  This paper’s 
analysis suggests that the government’s safety net programs made only negligible 
contribution to that favorable outcome.  There were both losers and gainers during this 
period. The paper’s findings indicate that these programs did not fulfill a genuine safety 
net role in protecting those who faced falling living standards during this period.  Part of 
the reason is low overall spending on these programs.  However, the evidence also 
suggests that poor targeting is a fundamental problem on top of low total outlays.   
The market economy has arguably increased the risks faced by households in 
Vietnam.  Incomes from production and labor supply are probably more variable (though 
with higher mean) while local risk-sharing arrangements appear to have declined.  This 
situation may well also lead to costly behavioral responses to mitigate and reduce risk.  
Vietnam may well find it increasingly difficult to sustainably reduce poverty in the future 
without concomitant efforts to provide more effective safety nets.     17 
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Table 1: Estimating the propensity to consume out of transfers 
 
  Consumption  Transfers  Consumption  
      OLS 
Consumption  
        IV 
Consumption 










transfers  0.449 
(4.33) 


















































































transfer*h'hold size          0.054 
(0.33) 
transfer*kids0-6          -0.144 
(0.71) 




        -0.384 
(1.71) 




        0.117 
(4.00) 
transfer*age          0.017 
(1.56) 
transfer*lang          -0.022 
(0.08) 




  0.011  0.036  0.058  0.051  0.077 













n  4303  4275  4275  4275  4275 
Source: 1993, 1998 VLSS  
Note: T-ratios in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering. 
Regressions have a complete set of household fixed effects in the levels as the models were estimated by 
regressing differences on differences.   20 
 
Table 2: Distribution of total transfers in 1998 under different assumptions about 




Per capita expenditures with 
tranfers fully included 
Per capita expenditures net of 
0.5* transfers  
Per capita expenditures net of 
transfers  












1  1,172,454     32,114  1,144,014  97,825  1,069,081     200,671 
2  1,726,660  62,826  1,687,589  87,785  1,640,672  101,649 
3  2,233,972  103,389  2,176,877  118,901  2,125,120  79,631 
4  3,060,385  175,997  2,983,414  130,764  2,926,035  100,081 
5  6,267,690  228,630  6,168,273  167,785  6,094,505  121,111 
total  2,892,607  120,612  2,832,301  120,612  2,771,995  120,612 
Source: 1998 VLSS 
Note: Quintiles are formed by ranking the population by household per capita expenditures under the 
different assumptions of the propensity to consume out of social transfers.  Transfers are those that can be 
identified in the 1998 VLSS—namely, social insurance and social subsidy funds, education scholarship, 
poverty alleviation and NGO funds.     
 
 
   21 
Table 3: Changes in incidence over time  
 















How did the « initial poor » fare? : 
1992 Net quintile:             
1  34,330  4.8  22.1 (775)  76,197  5.8  16.3 (775) 
2  39,166  3.4  19.7 (830)  90,452  5.0  17.0 (829) 
3  43,492  2.9  21.7 (850)  101,858  5.5  21.2 (850) 
4  54,532  2.8  23.4 (895)  130,822  5.4  21.6 (891) 
5  85,654  2.5  24.2 (958)  184,128  0.6  23.2 (958) 
Total  51,443  3.3  22.2 (4305)  116,641  4.5  19.8 (4303) 
How did the « long-term poor » fare? :  
Mean net quintile:              
1  35,041  4.6  24.2 (740)  80,468  7.1  16.5 (740) 
2  32,952  2.8  19.4 (809)  78,878  5.1  17.9 (809) 
3  50,290  3.6  21.3 (872)  117,442  6.0  22.2 (872) 
4  58,657  3.0  23.8 (924)  139,395  5.5  20.5 (924) 
5  77,257  2.5  22.5 (960)  166,996  1.5  22.0 (958) 
Total   51,443  3.3  22.2 (4305)  116,641  4.5  19.8 (4303) 
How did the «new poor » fare? : 
1998 Net quintile:              
1  38,652  4.1  23.0 (735)  91,545  3.2  17.6 (735) 
2  35,299  3.1  21.8 (797)  89,965  5.8  18.1 (797) 
3  51,934  3.5  22.7 (879)  114,218  5.6  22.3 (879) 
4  50,131  3.0  21.0 (929)  116,325  4.3  19.3 (929) 
5  76,857  2.9  22.6 (965)  171,121  3.4  21.8 (963) 
Total   51,443  3.3  22.2 (4305)  116,641  4.5  19.8 (4303) 
 
Source: 1993, 1998 VLSS. 
Note: Quintiles are national population quintiles constructed based on per capita expenditures net of half of 
social transfers.  The number of sample households in each quintile is given in parentheses.  Dong amounts 
are expressed on a per capita basis across the quintile populations. 
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Table 4: The incidence of changes in transfers by initial consumption and changes in 
consumption over time 
 
  Fall in 
consumption 
Consumption 
stayed the same 








111,901  246,476  241,658 
Low initial consumption 
          % receiving 
          transfer gain 







408,469  251,619  296,513 
Middle initial consumption 
          % receiving 
          transfer gain 







481,618  343,329  367,991 
High initial consumption 
          % receiving 
          transfer gain 
          n  496  221  720 
 
Source: 1993, 1998 VLSS.  
Note: The population is ranked into three equal groups based on 1993 per capita expenditures net of half of 
transfers and cross-tabbed against the level of their change in consumption over time net of half the change 
in transfers. The first number gives the percentage of households in the cell who received transfers in 1998.  
The second number gives the per capita amount of the change in transfers received by those with positive 
receipts only.  The final number gives the number of households in the cell.  Changes in transfers refer to 





Table 5: The baseline discrete joint distribution  
 
1998   
   1993       Poor                        Non-poor 
 
total   
33.54%  26.58%  60.12 
(55.78)  (44.22)  100 
Poor 
     
4.84%  35.04%  39.88 
(12.14)  (87.86)  100 
Non-poor 
     
total  38.38  61.62  100 
 
Source: 1993, 1998 VLSS.  
Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures at each 
date and cross-tabbed. The first number in each cell gives the percentage of total population who were in 
that row's poverty group in 1993 and that column's group in 1998.  The number in parentheses inside the 












Table 6: Joint distribution without transfers 
 
PROT= 0.31(0.66); PROM= 0.70(0.74) 
  
1998   
   1993       Poor                        Non-poor 
 
Total   
35.21%  25.88%  61.09 
(57.63)  (42.37)  100 
Poor 
     
5.15%  33.76%  38.91 
(13.24)  (86.76)  100 
Non-poor 
     
total  40.36  59.64  100 
 
Source: 1993, 1998 VLSS  
Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on their simulated without transfer per 
capita expenditures (minus .5*transfers) at each date and cross-tabbed.   z-scores in parentheses outside the 




Table 7: No change in transfers between 1993 and 1998 
 
PROT= 0.36(0.76); PROM=0.69(0.73) 
 
1998   
   1993       Poor                        Non-poor 
 
total   
34.23%  25.89%  60.12 
(56.94)  (43.06)  100 
Poor 
     
5.19%  34.69%  39.88 
(13.02)  (86.98)  100 
Non-poor 
     
total  39.43  60.57  100 
 
Source: 1993, 1998 VLSS.  
Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures for 1993 
and the simulated 1998 distribution had there been no change in transfers (per capita expenditures in 1998 
minus .5 of the change in transfers) and cross-tabbed.  z-scores in parentheses outside the table; critical 
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Table 8: Actual 1998 distribution versus uniform allocation of 1998 transfers  
 
              1998  simulated   
 1998 actual       Poor                        Non-poor 
 
total  actual  
35.54%   2.83%  38.38 
(92.61)  (7.39)  100 
Poor 
     
1.54%  60.09%  61.62 
(2.49)  (97.51)  100 
Non-poor 
     
total simulated  37.08  62.92  100 
Source: 1998 VLSS  
Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures for 1998 
and the simulated 1998 distribution had the five transfers identifiable in 1998 been distributed uniformly 




Table 9: Actual 1998 distribution versus 1998 transfers targeted on equal per capita 
basis to the poor  
 
               1998 simulated   
  1998 actual       Poor                        Non-poor 
 
total  actual  
 31.72%  6.66%  38.38 
(82.66)  (17.34)  100 
Poor 
     
1.98%  59.64%  61.62 
(3.21)  (96.79)  100 
Non-poor 
     
total simulated  33.70  66.30  100 
Source: 1998 VLSS  
Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures for 1998 
and the simulated 1998 distribution had the five transfers identifiable in 1998 been distributed per capita 





Table 10: The incidence of proportionate changes in social incomes 
 
1998 
















Source: 1993, 1998 VLSS. 
Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on their actual per capita expenditures at 
each date and cross-tabbed.  The numbers give the percentage change in the three transfers between the 
dates. 
 